The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous game with a number of potential deviators being a parameter of the game. A definition of the game embeds a mechanism design. The game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium encompasses intra and inter group externalities and an individual payoff allocation that make it different from a strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium and some other equilibrium concepts. We offer a non-cooperative stability criterion to describe a robustness of an equilibrium strategy profile to an increase in a number of deviators. The criterion may serve as a way to measure self-enforcement or a trust for the equilibrium in terms of a number of potential deviators and the mechanism design.
Introduction
This paper studies the question coming from the paper "Equilibrium points in n-person games" by John . His paper established equilibrium condition for an assumption that every player considers himself to be a unique deviator. The natural questions are: if a player assumes that beside her/him there are also some other deviators, then which game is played, and what is an equilibrium concept for this game?
Consider an example with three players N = {1, 2, 3}. Strong Nash equilibrium of Aumann (1959) is based on a deviation of a coalition of any size, without specification of internal coalition structure. Are the coalition structures of all three players: {{1}, {2}, {3}}, {{12}, {3}}, {{13}, {2}}, {{1}, {23}} are different or not for the strong Nash equilibrium. We can not have an unambiguous answer.
1
Traditional way to study the problem is through cooperative game theory.
However Maskin (2011) pointed out: "I believe that there are three (related) reasons for the historical shift from cooperative to noncooperative theory: (a) most cooperative theory ignores externalities, the possibility that a coalition can be affected by the actions of those not in the coalition; (b) it assumes that a Pareto efficient outcome will be reached; and (c) it supposes that the grand coalition (the coalition of all players) will form." Studying a deviation of more than one player is impossible without structuring a deviating set. 4 The suggested approach resolves this problem by embedding a mechanism design into a definition of a simultaneous game.
The paper offers to change a role for a central planner in comparison to 2 The question of studying multiple deviators is far from being too theoretical one. Take European currency system, which was designed as an equilibrium system for several heterogenous interactive economies. A membership requires meeting some requirements, debt/GNP ratio, for simplicity. If there is only one deviator, then all other members are able to make a decision to implement a punishing regulation, and the initially desirable equilibrium presumable can be reinstalled. However if there are many deviators, do the deviating countries make a decision to penalize themselves? So comes the question -what is a maximum number of deviators, under which European Currency union remains stable? One may expect the same problem in international emission agreements. 3 The Shapley value approach is inappropriate here as besides other limitations, it does not deal with deviations after a coalition is formed. 4 An example above. an uncertainty in a number of potential deviators or an evolutionary selection of group formation rules.
A game for a fixed number of deviators K is constructed as follows. Individual strategy set consists of strategies a player may choose for every partition (coalition structures) from a family of all eligible partitions P(K).
A player chooses a partition and what to do for a chosen partition. A set of all strategies, a Cartesian product of strategies of all players, is divided by a family of group formation rules R(K) into partition-specific domains, where every strategy profile is mapped to only one final partition. A realized partition depends on strategies of all players. Every partition is an individual non-cooperative game of Nash. Individual payoffs are partition specific, 6 thus every partition contains between and within externalities for every player.
All important sets ( expected utility operator and probability measure sets ) are organized as bounded, closed, continuous etc, in a way that a fixed point Schauder theorem can be applied, and an equilibrium in mixed strate-5 in terminology of Aumann, Dreze (1974) 6 similar to contingent payoffs in finance gies exists. The introduced K-Nash equilibrium does not have an uncertainty about K, although it is just a step further.
A non-cooperative stability criterion for an equilibrim is constructed as follows. Any equilibrium in the defined game depends on a predefined number of deviators. The question is -will an equilibrium change if to increase a number of deviators (a parameter of the game)? 7 What is a maximum number of deviators, which still preserves the equilibrium constructed for less values of the parameter? 8 Hence the criterion becomes a measure of trust, or a measure of self-enforcement of an equilibrium. The suggestion is to entitle this criterion as "Leon Hurwicz non-cooperative stability criterion", as it is based on incentive compatibility, introduced by him into economic analysis.
Relation of the result with a strong Nash equilibrium are discussed in further. The basic differences are: more flexible coalition structures and a presence of between/within externalities. The introduced concept allows to construct a non-cooperative stability criterium.
The paper has the following structure -Section 2 introduces a basic notation, Section 3 presents a game and its properties, Section 4 suggests a stability criterion and Section 5 discusses the results. 7 This question is another side of opportunistic behavior in groups -what a player knows about a number of potential deviators from an equilibrium. 8 It is clear that this comparison requires to compare expected payoffs in different games. criterion is constructed independently from a game or mechanism design.
Basic notation
Consider a non-cooperative game of N players, i ∈ N , N is finite. Every i ∈ N is assigned a strategy set S i = {s i }, a bounded subset from R, and a payoff U i : × i∈N S i → R, real valued Lebegue integrable function over S = × i∈N S i . We assume that for all i ∈ N there is a finite M < ∞ such that s∈S U i (s)ds ≤ M . This guarantees compactness of a kernel of an expected utility integral operator for every player further. Γ = N, (S i ) i∈N , (U i ) i∈N is a standard non-cooperative game of Nash.
A mixed strategy σ i (a probability measure S i ) of i is an element of an (infinitely-dimenstional ) probability space ∆(S i ) over a measurable set S i .
This set includes also probability measures concentrated in single points.
Expected utility of i is defined as a mapping
The notation ∆(S i ) × × j∈N \{i} ∆(S j ) emphasizes that a player makes his choice of a mixed strategy given mixed strategy profile of all other players.
Expected utility a well-defined linear functional over ∆(S i ), what implies compactness of expected utility, and uniform continuity (Ljusternik, Sobolev, (1982) , also Lax (2002) ). Notations −i = (j) j∈N \{i} , s −i = (s j ) j∈N \{i} , σ −i = (σ j ) j∈N \{i} are standard. The set EU i is bounded, compact, complete and continuous. Definition 1. Nash equilibrium is a profile of mixed strategies (σ * i ) i∈N (probability measures) such that for every
The space ∆(S i ) is a bounded, complete, uniformly bounded and uniformly convex set (Balakrishnan, 1971 ). This set includes also probability measures concentrated in single points. The same properties of mixed strategies will reappear in the main model. Further we use the understanding that every fixed value of K means that a size of any deviating group in any partition does not exceed K. K is the same for all players, and is common knowledge.
Let P(K) = {P β : β} be a family of all partitions of players from N with a partition index β. A size of any group g β from a partition P β can not accede the exogenously fixed parameter K. Let G = #P(K) is the size of the family P(K), i.e. G is a number of eligible partitions in the game. 9 The family P(K) (or coalition structures in terminology of Aumann and Dreze, 1974 ) is offered by a central planner.
For example, a set of players is N = {1, 2, 3}, and let K = 2. Then possible partitions can be P β=1 = {{1}, {2}, {3}}, P β=2 = {{1, 2}, {3}},
can not be reached as a size of the only group, a grand coalition, is greater than K = 2. These partition examples are used further in developing of the example.
Parameter K defines a maximum number of deviators: for any i a size of a group in any P β can not be greater that K. identifies that i chooses a partition P β i . 10 Realization of a final partition depends on strategies of all players. We leave for future research partitionspecific externalities, when a final partition depends on a partition choice of 9 Examples can be sizes of firms or social restrictions on a maximum group size. 10 with the assumptions of participation in only one group for every i.
all players.
The difference between indices β and β i is the following: β i is an index of a desirable partition for i, and β is an index of a realized partition P β , after all strategies of all players are announced. In the general case β = β i as a final partition depends on strategies of all players, and does not need to match an individual choice.
For every i a set of strategies of a desirable partition β i is S β i , a subset from R. For a partition β i player i chooses an action s β i from S β i . For a further example we assume that for every partition every player has only two
all players for a fixed K.
An example of strategy sets for different K
A set of strategies of i for K = 1 is S i (K = 1) = {0, 1} β i =1 as for K = 1 any partition with group size more than 1 can not be formed. A set of strategies
where is a disjoint union symbol.
A set of all strategies of all players for K = 1 is
A set of all strategies of all players for K = 2 is
Group formation rules
A definition of a game embeds mechanism design, i.e. a number of deviators, a collection of eligible partitions (coalition structures) and a family of group formation rules for these partitions. Partitions were described above, here we present group formation rules and some their properties.
A family of group formation rules R(K) prescribes how partitions from P(K) share a set of all strategies S into non-overlapping domains with a complete coverage of S. In other words: the R(P ) assigns a unique final partition P β for every element s from S. Every partition P β is a separate noncooperative game of Nash with a predefined partition. Another interpretation is that R(K) is a set of social rules or norms defined on a set of all strategies
S(K).
"The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take place", (Finus and Rundshagen, 2003 ). An example further demonstrates that different chosen strategies may lead to the same partition. Further a triple {K, P(K), R(P )} we address as a mechanism design.
Formally the family of coalition formation rules R(K) is defined as
A set S β is a set of all strategies of all players for a partition P β . S β may be open and consist of disjoint sets. Every S β is a bounded measurable subset in R N . The family has a property:
every strategy profile s from S is assigned a unique partition P β .
Domain of R(K) is a set of all strategies of all players S(K).
The range of R(K) is a collection of sets {S β | β = 1, . . . , G}, where every component S β contains all strategy profiles for a partition P β from P(K).
The construction implies that there are two expansions for S: one from input strategies S(K) = × i∈N S i (K), and one from partition-specific strategies
All mismatches between individual partition choices must be anticipated in R(K). Thus a choice of a partition becomes also a choice of a structure for partition-specific externalities. Studying properties of R we leave for a future paper as well as partition-specific externalities.
It is clear that the family R(K) is more complicated than a simple coalition function (for example, as in Finus and Rundshagen, 2003) . The suggested approach is also different from partition approach.
An example: a unanimous group formation rule
Let R(K) be a unanimous group formation rule, i.e. when any group g β in any P β can be formed only from a unanimous agreement (choices ) of players from g β . However the same group can be present in different partitions,
Let all players from a group g β choose the same partition P β , then formation of the P β still depends on partitions chosen by all other players, in N \g β . But in any unanimous formation rule any final partition contains either non-trivivial unanimously formed groups or only singletons.
Let there is a mismatch in choices of players i 1 , i 2 , who have a common group in some partition Pβ, but choose different partitions Pβ (by i 1 ) and
Then partition Pβ can not be formed from a unanimous rule, and in any final partition a player i 2 obtains a singleton. We can not say anything definite about final allocation of player i 1 as there is not enough information. Table 3 .2.1 presents transformation of individual strategy subsets into partition specific strategy profiles. The first column contains values for a number of deviators. In this column we used nested property of strategy sets. For every K and every β a set or partition specific strategies S β (K) has the same structure,
We can see that the same partitions with three singletons, {{1}, {2}, {3}}, appear in three different cases, thus family formation rule R(K) does not have an invertible transformation. The index any means any eligible partition from a corresponding P(K). Table 1 : Unanimous rule formation of partition-specific strategy sets {S β } from individual choices of players, N = 3.
Payoffs and definition of a game
Let U β i s β : S β → R be a payoff function for i in a partition P β , defined for every strategy profile
Every partition is a separate non-cooperative game of Nash. The games are united by mechanism design and mixed strategy sets of the players defined over all possible strategy profiles, framed by partitions.
This payoff functions capture both intra and inter group externalities.
Intra-group externalities are natural for any game. However the presence of inter-group externalities is not so well studied. Their importance for group formation is well discussed in Olson (p.17, 1971 ).
be a non-cooperative game of N players, where mechanism design consists of no more than K deviators, final partitions P(K), a family of group formation rules R(K), individual properties of the players are: strategy sets S i (K) and
For further construction of a stability criterium we can define a family of games, as
As far as with an increase of K sets of strategies are nested than payoffs functions for a game with less K are included into a game with a greater
This property will be used further for construction of a non-cooperative stability criterion.
Timing of the game is traditional for simultaneous games. Before the game all players obtain all fundamentals of the game from Γ(K) and construct their beliefs about what may other players do. Then all players move simultaneously. Construction of an equilibrium does not need axioms besides individual rationality of a non-cooperative game of Nash.
An example of payoffs
We continue the example above. Let individual payoffs be defined in the simplest way. 12 Let s i be a strategy of i and s = (s i ) i∈N be a strategy profile which leads to a realization of a partition P β with a partition-specific strategy profile s β ≡ s. Table 2 presents the payoffs for K = 1, 2, 3: Table 2 : Payoffs in a unanimous group formation game for different K. Individual partition-contingent payoff depends only on i's strategy, however a realization of a partition depends on a whole strategy profile s. 
, thus after an increase in K we need to define payoffs only for the newly added areas. An increase in K means a consideration of three games: Γ(K = 1), Γ(K = 2) and Γ(K = 3).
Payoffs in the game are constructed in such a way that even K = 3, i.e. in the game Γ(K = 3) ), neither player is interested to choose a grand coalition {1, 2, 3} in comparison to a case of the game Γ(K = 2). This means that an increase in a number of deviators from K = 2 to K = 3 does not result in better off for players. Table 3 : Payoff maximizing strategies of players for a unanimous group formation rule with different number of deviators K players s * Table 3 contains payoff maximizing pure strategy profiles, but they are not unique for K > 1. The next section presents a mixed strategies equilibrium.
Mixed strategies, expected utility and definition of an equilibrium
Let ∆(S i (K)) be an infinitely-dimensional probability space over S i (K), i.e. a set of mixed strategies ( probability measures) over S i (K).
Expected utility for i is defined as a sum of partition-contingent payoffs, like expected utility over contingent states in finance. For every i expected utility is a mapping
it is a well-defined bounded linear functional over ∆(S i (K)). Expected utility is written down in this way to emphasize that every i chooses his/her mixed strategy over S i (K) given mixed strategy profile of all other players.
Expected utility can be written in more details in terms of partitionspecific strategies
where every partition P β j is available for i from P.
A mixed strategy of all other players σ −i (K) is defined as usual,
Due to the property of S, which has two expansions, we can write down expected utility in terms of original strategies, but is it much more complicated expression. Relation between the two representations of mixed strategies is explained in a subsection on measure transportation.
Clearly the set EU
is bounded, complete, compact and continuous over a set of all mixed strategies ∆(S i ) i∈N . Continuity for EU
is a uniform continuity, (Lax, 2005) . All these properies are crucial for application of fixed point theorems.
An example of mixed strategies
A set of mixed strategies of i in the game above with N = 3 and K = 1 is
A set of mixed strategies of i in the game above with N = 3 and K = 2 is
and
Both sets of mixed strategies are written in terms of initial strategies due to a better visuability. A relation between mixed strategies on initial strategies and their transformations in terms of partition-specific strategies is written down further.
Sets of mixed strategies in the nested games Γ(K = 1), Γ(K = 2), Γ(K = 3) are different due to nested properties of strategy sets. We do not specify partition specific mixed strategies here as they have more com-plicated representation. Relation between two types of mixed strategies is discussed further.
An equilibrium
Definition 2. K-Nash equilibrium for K simultaneously (or parallel) deviators is a mixed strategy profile σ
such that for every i ∈ N and for every
Theorem 1. K-Nash equilibrium exists.
For every i the space ∆ S i (K) is bounded, closed, complete and convex. It also contains concentrated distributions, and is uniformly convex.
Bounded convex set of probability measures is also uniform bounded and uniform continuous, a necessary and sufficient condition for weak convergency of mixed strategies (probability measures).
Uniform continuity of the set EU
over mixed strategies is required to ensure that i's best response arg max
is a continuous, bounded and compact mapping.
Existence of an equilibrium follows immediately from the properties of compactness, completness and uniform continuity of every mappings, i = 1, N :
with a final application of the Shauder fixed point theorem as a mapping of a compact and continuous operator (Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ N ) to a continuous, convex set
Introduced K-Nash equilibrium concepts differ from the strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1950) in few respects -there is no restriction that all deviators move as one group even if K = N , the players have externalities between each other and with those, who do not deviate, there are explicit individual payoffs. There is no assumption about super-additivity of payoffs, hence the game allows to study an equilibrium and efficiency separately.
The game includes inter and intra-group externalities between players, mentioned by Maskin (2011) as a research program to study non-cooperative group formation. There are also differences with coalition-proof equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg Whinston, 1987 ) and k-equilibrium: these concepts assume deviation of a group as a whole unit. The proposed concept allows a deviation of coalition structure, which can not be described only by it's size.
Approach of Mertens and Zamir (1978) established the link between mixed strategies and types of players. The presented game can be reconstructed also as a game of private information, where a player's type is his choice of players to deviate with and a strategy to choose.
An example of equilibrium mixed strategies
It is clear that in the example above every player will choose a unit quantity to submit to a chosen partition. But for values K = 2, 3 a player needs to randomize between partition choices. Probabilities for different partition choices are presented in Table 4 . In a general case calculation of mixed strategies may become complicated.
Measure transformation mapping R(K)
Measure transportation property establishes consistency between initial individual mixed strategies from S i (possibly defined in real terms) and partition-specific mixed strategies, ( see Billingsley (1965 Billingsley ( , 1999 , Dudley (2005) , Schilling (2002) on measure transportation).
In the example above a set of all strategies of a game Γ(K) has two representations: one in terms of initial strategies of all players S(K = 2) = × i∈N S i (K = 2), another in terms of partition specific strategies ∪ β S β = S,
property of the transformation R(K) is based on the property of strategies:
In the example above the group formation rule R(K = 1) for K = 1 is trivial, and measure invertible, as it induces only a partition of singletons,
But K = 2 and K = 3 induce more than one final partition. In every case a final partition is backward invertible, as for every
However a reverse is not true, R −1 (K)(S β ) may not be a unique for K = 2, 3, that is clear from the example above. For example, In Table 1 the final partition {{1}, {2}, {3}} is induced by five different initial strategy sets.
Consider the problem of a mixed strategies over partition-specific strategy sets in more details. We have seen that for K = 2, 3 a partition {{1}, {2}, {3}} can be appear from three different sets of strategies. Let a set of one's strategy for a partition β i is S i,
be a set of strategies of all players in a partition {{1}, {2}, {3}}}, such that
The partition {{1}, {2}, {3}}} can be formed either from a choice of all players or from a mismatch of choices of the players. We assume that players act independently. Probability of a mixed strategy profile of all three players in the partition {{1}, {2}, {3}} can be reconstructed from mixed strategies profile from initial strategies of all three players as
Probability measure for other partitions are constructed simpler, for ex-ample:
We leave for future detailed investigation of measure transportation issues, as it requires additional topics from measure and ergodic theories.
Equilibrium vs. stability
The game Γ(K) has an additional degree of flexibility in comparison to original non-cooperative game of Nash: a number of deviators. Every equilibrium in a game Γ(K) is based on a number of deviators K. Within the suggested game we can ask a question: what a player knows about a number of deviators in a game Γ(K) after the equilibrium is formed, can a number of deviators increase, and actually is played another game Γ(K 1 ), K 1 > K? 13 This question is equivalent to one -how a player can be sure that the game has no more than K deviators? A rational player should anticipate this before accepting an equilibrium with K deviators. This is what can be called as an opportunistic behavior in groups.
We can ask the question differently: an equilibrium strategy profile σ * (K)
is robust to a change in K or not?
Let there is a list of games, {Γ(K), K = 1, . . . , N }. The games are related to each other with the properties: P(K = 1) ⊂ . . . ⊂ P(K = N ) and 13 We can address this property as an opportunistic behavior.
An above example with a unanimous group formation rule demonstrated how this can be done.
Let σ * (K) be an equilibrium strategy profile for a game Γ(K). A Nash equilibrium is the inequality, which compares motivations: 
be an induced equilibrium strategy profile with an expected payoff EU
The suggestion is to consider the right-side of Nash equilibrium inequality,
, as an expected payoff when i deviates in groups size different from K. Let K = K OU T for a deviation from the equilibrium,
be an a corresponding equilibrium strategy profile in a game Γ(K OU T ) = Γ(K IN ). An equilibrium expected payoff in this case will be
.
Thus with the K-Nash equilibrium we can ask a question about a robustness of an equilibrium strategy profile σ * (K IN ) to a variation in K, i.e. for cases when K IN = K OU T .
For any K 1 , K 2 , K 1 < K 2 , the domains of pure strategies are nested 
meaning that the equilibrium strategy profile σ * (K IN ) is also an equilibrium for any K OU T , K OU T < K IN . However if K IN < K OU T this statement may be no longer true. We gave seen this in the example above , when K increased from one to two.
We are interested in a maximum number of deviators, when an equilibrium still holds true, i.e.
We can address K * as a confidence of all players to an induced equi-
(other suggested terms: s trust to an equilibrium, a measure of commitment or a self-enforcement equilibrium property ). K * is a maximum number of deviators, which still does not break the equilibrium
. We suggest to address K * as a "Hurwicz non-cooperative criterion" due to incentive compatibility mechanism behind it and the input of is equal to three, K * = 3, as σ
We can summarize this section by constructing a network of equilibria for the game in the example. Equilibrium strategy profiles are ordered as
, meaning an order of expected
Further research can deal with a lattice of equilibria, induced by a game family {Γ(K), K = 1, . . . , N }.
An application to self-enforcing property of an equilibrium
The case when a change in a number of deviators changes a number of equilibria was already discussed in literature, for example, a "stag and hare" game. Take an example from Aumann (1991), a response to D.Kreps.
If every player is allowed to deviate unilaterally, than there are two equilibria in pure strategies and one in mixed. Two equilibria in pure strategies are ranked by gain sizes. But it is impossible to move from one to another pure strategies equilibrium only by a one-step unilateral deviation of either player. However for K = 2 there is only one equilibrium in pure strategies (100; 100). An increase in a number of deviators supports only one equilibrium in pure strategies. Thus a game with two deviators allows immediately to reach (100; 100).
An increase from K = 1 to K = 2 eliminates the necessity to control a number of deviators and justifies the conclusion of Aumann (1991) that the strategy profile (c, c): "almost surely will be played without agreement". We may assume the Schelling's concept of "focal point" to compare equilibria in terms of payoffs for every player is implicitly based on letting more than one player to deviate. The suggested approach offers a way for selection of multiple equilibria ordered by payoffs.
However in practice there is an uncertainty, which game is played -a game with two deviators or game with one deviator? In other words, every player may have an uncertainty, which game is played, Γ(K = 1) or Γ(K = 2). This ruins an equilibrium in pure strategies again.
The same example can be reconsidered in more details. It explicitly assumes that every hunter in a two-person game may hunt for every animal alone or together. We can see that the game Γ(K = 1) is located at four left-top cells and has one equilibrium in weakly-dominating strategies. The game Γ(K = 2) is presented by the whole Table 6 , and it has one equilibria in strictly dominating strategies. These corresponds to the "focal point" concept of Schelling.
Conclusion
Myerson (p.370, 1991) noted that "we need some model of cooperative behavior that does not abandon the individual decision-theoretic foundations of game theory". One of the key obstacle of this research program is a demand for a non-cooperative equilibrium with many deviators. This paper serves to study cases of "a non-cooperative cooperation", i.e. within a one-shot game framework the paper directly addresses the question: which individual motivations may appear after a group is formed on an individual base, or informally, how many players may want to deviate ex post a group is formed. This paper suggests a possible non-cooperative toolkit. The constructed game allows to study a cooperative behavior within a non-cooperative framework, where the individuals "rationally further their individual interests" ( Olson, 1971) . Informally the paper targets a non-cooperative equilibrium for those cases, when a number of deviators can vary from one (Nash) till everybody (Aumann) .
The justification of a chosen tool, a non-cooperative game, comes from Maskin (2011) and a remark of Serrano (2014) , that for studying coalition formation "it may be worth to use strategic-form games, as proposed in the Nash program".
The paper suggests a possible solution for the Nash problem: how to modify a non-cooperative game and a corresponding equilibrium concept in such a way that we can study non-cooperative formation of groups. A constructed non-cooperative simultaneous game with a modified strategy set has a number of deviators as an exogenous parameter of the game along with an embedded mechanism design feature. Investigation of an uncertainty in a number of deviators is left for the future.
The introduced family of equilibria concepts refines strong Nash, coalitionproof and k equilibrium concepts. The differences are: an explicit allocation of payoffs and a combined presence of intra-and inter-group externalities (the list of differences is not complete). Differences from the core-approach of Aumann (1960) are obvious -a presence of externalities, no restrictions that deviates only one group, no restrictions on a direction of a deviation (inside or outside), and a construction of individual payoffs from a strategy profile of all players. Finally the introduced concepts enables to offer a non-cooperative stability criterion, unfeasible for other equilibrium concepts.
The suggested approach is different in a role for a central planner offered by Nash, who "argued that cooperative actions are the result of some process of bargaining" Myerson (p.370, 1991) . Central planner offers a predefined mechanism design framework, that includes a number of deviators, family of eligible partitions and a family of rules to construct these partitions from individual strategies.
Pre-announced family of group formation rules R can be considered as special case of networks (Myerson, (1977) , Aumann and Myerson, (1978) ). In the forthcoming paper the author addresses the problem a non-cooperative equilibrium in network games.
The paper suggests a way to measure a trust to an equilibrium as a maximum number of deviators, which still does not destroy an equilibrium strategy profile for an initially chosen number of deviators. 14 Construction of the criterion does not depend on a family of group formation rules. This measure can also be considered as a self-enforcing property of an equilibrium.
It captures the idea of an opportunistic behavior in groups when a rational 14 The difference from traditional "blocking approach " is that here it comes on a noncooperative base with details mentioned above.
player before playing a game should anticipate number of potential deviators ex post groups are formed.
The approach allows to be more specific about opportunistic behavior in comparison to the Shapley value and similar measures of coalition stability. Direct next research includes network formation, general equilibrium and repeated games applications of the suggested model. Other important directions are a non-cooperative welfare theory with group formation and a non-cooperative mechanism studies.
